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BY  MANY INDICATIONS  , the behavior  of average  union  wages in the early 
1980s contrasts sharply  with their behavior over most of the postwar 
period. During  the 1970s  the basic mechanisms  of union wage determi- 
nation were in many ways solidified: the average duration of labor 
agreements  continued to increase as the reach of multiyear  contracts 
was extended, and there was a substantial  expansion in the number  of 
formal  cost-of-living  adjustment  (COLA)  provisions;  many  large  unions 
adhered  to a policy of negotiating  an annual  improvement  factor plus 
COLA despite the fact that the productivity  trends that formed the 
original  justification for the annual improvement  factor had greatly 
deteriorated;  and while there has always been considerable  dispersion 
in the results  of individual  negotiations,  wage  dispersion  within  the union 
sector appeared  to increase as labor agreements  that included COLA 
clauses ultimately  yielded higher  pay increases than those that did not. 
In  addition,  average  union  wage  increases  consistently  exceeded average 
nonunion  wage increases during  the 1970s,  raising  the union-nonunion 
wage differential  to a historic  high  by the early 1980s. 
All was not well within  the union  sector, however. The power  of labor 
unions rests on their ability  to sustain  barriers  to entry. Over the years 
different  unions  have sought  to restrict  nonunion  competition  in various 
ways,  such as rationing access  to training for some skills through 
apprenticeship  programs,  organizing  all the producers  of a particular 
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product  and  its close substitutes  in  order  to lower  the  elasticity  of demand 
for their  members'  services, and  trying  to close off substitution  possibil- 
ities by supporting  protectionist  trade  policies. 
During  the late 1970s  a confluence  of events resulted  in an unprece- 
dented assault on union  jurisdiction  in several-but  by no means all- 
major  industries.  For  the highly  unionized  airline  and  trucking  industries, 
the challenge  has come from  new, domestic  nonunion  competition-the 
traditional  source  of challenge  to union  power-as  deregulation  removed 
barriers  to entry into what are basically competitive markets. For the 
highly  unionized  "smokestack"  industries,  the challenge  has come from 
the increasing  share  of American  markets  supplied  by foreign  producers. 
By 1980,  for example, imports  accounted  for 22 percent  of the U.S. auto 
market, an increase of 83 percent over the import share in 1970. The 
import share of nonferrous  metals more than doubled over the same 
period  to about 18  percent. During  the 1970s  the import  share  also more 
than doubled in the apparel, textile, footwear, and metal machinery 
industries.' Finally, the deep recession of the early 1980s produced 
extensive layoffs and plant  closings, adding  to the market  pressures  on 
unions. 
These events registered  their first major  effect on union power in a 
sequence of collective bargaining  agreements in several industries, 
beginning  in 1979 with the contract between the United Automobile 
Workers  (UAW) and Chrysler  Corporation.  All told, these agreements 
yielded  concessions in wages, fringe  benefits,  and  a variety  of work  rules 
in exchange  for slower  rates  of employment  loss, commitments  to divert 
labor-cost savings into investment and modernization, measures to 
increase the institutional  security of unions (for example, management 
neutrality  toward union organizing  efforts at new plants), and mecha- 
nisms to provide  at least partial  restoration  of wage and  benefit  conces- 
sions at some future  date.2  The most immediate  result  of these develop- 
1. In some  cases the growth  of imports  was no doubt  a response  to the increased  union 
relative  wage. For example,  by 1980,  average  hourly  earnings  in the automobile  industry 
relative  to the private  nonfarm  sector  generally  had  increased  by 20  percent  over  the 1964- 
69 period. For steel and coal the comparable  figures are 30 percent and 20 percent, 
respectively,  by 1982. See Marvin  H. Kosters, "Disinflation  in the Labor  Market,"  in 
William Fellner,  ed.,  Essays  in Contemporary Economic  Problems: Disinflation  (Wash- 
ington,  D.C.: American  Enterprise  Institute,  1984),  pp. 247-86. 
2. This  was not the first  instance  of union  contract  concessions  in the postwar  period, 
but the scale of recent concessions bargaining  is unprecedented.  For a review of past Robert J. Flanagan  185 
ments has been that in the early 1,980s,  union wage adjustments  have 
been a part of the general  wage deceleration  rather  than a drag  on it. I 
review this aspect of recent concession bargaining  in the first  section of 
the  paper  with  particular  attention  to the  gap  between  union  and  nonunion 
wages. 
Another  aspect of recent concession bargaining  involves new means 
for adjusting  pay to future contingencies. One novel feature of recent 
concessions is a willingness  to incorporate  compensation  arrangements 
that  effectively index part  of the pay package  to the performance  of the 
firm.  In the second section below, I consider  this and other contingent 
pay arrangements  embodied  in recent concessions to evaluate  whether 
they portend  a durable  change  in the flexibility  of union  wages. 
These relatively recent developments occur at a time when union 
membership  in the private  sector  is at its lowest point  since the late 1930s 
and  early  1940s,  when  major  union  growth  began.  Unions  tend  to attribute 
their currently low membership to illegal activity by employers in 
resisting  union organizing  efforts. In addition,  a series of decisions by 
the National Labor Relations Board and the Supreme  Court  appear  to 
challenge some of the basic rights governing  the collective bargaining 
relationship  in the United States. In the final section of the paper, I 
examine  the question  of whether  recent  legal  developments  have altered 
the relative  bargaining  power of labor  and  management. 
Recent Wage Adjustments 
Several  measures  of wages and  compensation  reported  in table 1  trace 
the general features of the wage acceleration of the late 1970s and 
deceleration of the early 1980s. Increases of the broadest indexes- 
hourly  compensation  and  hourly  earnings-peaked in the 10-13 percent 
range  in 1980  and  then decelerated  very rapidly  to the 4-5 percent  range 
by 1983. At this level of aggregation,  it appears that at least through 
1982,  wage behavior  did  not deviate  significantly  from  the course  implied 
by previous  wage equations.3 
episodes, see Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Recent Union Contract  Concessions," BPEA, 
1:1982,  pp. 165-201. 
3. See George  L. Perry,  "What  Have  We  Learned  about  Disinflation?"  BPEA,  2:1983, 
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Table 1.  The Recent Deceleration of Wages and Compensation, 1976-83 
Percent change 
1976-78 
Measure  (average)  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Hourly compensation  indexa 
Nonfarm business  sector  8.2  9.2  10.8  9.0  7.2  4.8 
Manufacturing  8.4  9.8  12.7  8.8  7.2  4.7 
Durable  8.1  9.5  13.8  8.7  6.9  4.5 
Nondurable  8.2  10.5  11.2  9.0  8.7  4.5 
Hourly earnings  indexb 
Manufacturing  8.4  8.9  10.6  8.6  6.0  2.8 
Employment cost  index, 
wages  and salariesb 
Private nonfarm sector  7.3  8.7  9.0  8.8  6.3  5.0 
Union  7.8  9.0  10.9  9.6  6.5  4.6 
Nonunion  7.0  8.5  8.0  8.5  6.1  5.2 
Manufacturing  8.1  8.6  9.4  8.7  5.6  4.3 
Union  8.5  9.4  11.0  8.9  5.8  3.6 
Nonunion  7.7  7.9  7.9  8.3  5.6  4.7 
Nonmanufacturing  6.9  8.8  8.8  9.0  6.5  5.5 
Union  7.2  8.5  10.8  10.2  7.1  5.5 
Nonunion  6.8  8.8  8.1  8.6  6.2  5.5 
State and local government  ...  ...  ...  ...  6.5  5.3 
Effective  union wage 
changesa 
Private sector  8.1  9.1  9.9  9.5  6.8  4.0 
State and local government  . .  .  5.7  6.5  8.7  6.6  5.2 
Source:  Hourly compensation  and earnings indexes  are from U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Employment  cost 
index is from Ciurretnt  Wage Developmenits,  vol.  34 (May  1983), pp. 41-47.  Effective  union wage changes  are from 
BLS,  Newvs, January 30 and February 23,  1984. 
a.  Fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
b.  December  to December. 
UNION  AND  NONUNION  WAGE  DEVELOPMENTS 
By removing  the effects of employment  shifts  among  occupations  and 
industries,  the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS) Employment  Cost 
Index (ECI) provides a cleaner measure  of wages and salaries  and has 
the additional  advantage  of providing  separate  information  on union  and 
nonunion  wage developments.4  These data  reveal  a more  varied  story  of 
4. The gaps in table 1 reflect  the gaps in the development  of the ECI. The series has 
included  indexes  of wages  and  salaries  in  the private  sector  since  September  1975.  Indexes 
of total compensation  were added in late 1979  and 1980,  and wage and compensation 
indexes  for state  and  local government  employees  were begun  in June  1981. Robert J. Flanagan  187 
the recent deceleration and the role of unions in that deceleration. 
Normally,  nonunion  wages have led the wage  deceleration  and  displayed 
greater  cyclical variance,  while union  wages, reflecting  the influence  of 
long-term  contracts in which the wage provisions for later years are 
negotiated long before the economic environment  of the increases is 
known,  have tended  to lag the deceleration  in nonunion  wages and  have 
had  less cyclical variance.  In contrast  to the usual  pattern,  union  wages 
led nonunion  wages in the deceleration  of the early 1980s. In both the 
manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing  sectors, union wage increases 
peaked in 1980, while nonunion wages continued to accelerate to a 
(lower)  peak  in 1981.  Consistent  with differences  in union  strength  in the 
two sectors, overall wage increases in manufacturing  peaked in 1980 
with union  wage increases and then began  to decline despite the contin- 
ued acceleration  of nonunion  wages, while increases  in nonmanufactur- 
ing wages peaked in 1981  with nonunion  wage increases. 
The greater deceleration  in 1982 and 1983 in manufacturing  wages 
relative to nonmanufacturing  appears  to be entirely attributable  to the 
relatively  rapid  deceleration  of union  manufacturing  wages. (The decel- 
eration of nonunion  wages is essentially the same in each sector.) By 
1983,  wage increases in manufacturing  were less for unionized  workers 
than for nonunionized  workers for the first time since 1969.  It is more 
difficult  to track  the recent behavior  of fringe  benefits. Nevertheless, a 
comparison  of the wage and salary  data  with  the compensation  data  (not 
shown in the table) provided by the ECI indicates that outside of 
unionized  manufacturing,  the growth  of fringe  benefits  has slowed less 
than  the growth  of wages. 
The data in table 1 also reveal that recent union wage adjustments 
have only just begun to reverse the thirteen-year  growth  of the union- 
nonunion  wage differential  in manufacturing  and  have merely  halted  the 
recent growth of the differential  in nonmanufacturing.  Between 1969 
and 1982,  for example, the union-nonunion  wage gap in manufacturing 
widened by 13.5 percentage points.5  It would take another decade of 
differences  in union and nonunion  wage growth  of the size observed in 
1983  to restore  the relative  union  wage in manufacturing  to its 1969  level. 
5. The estimate is computed  from the BLS Wage Developments  in Manufacturing 
series  for 1969-75  and from the Employment  Cost Index  for 1976-82.  The former  series 
can be found  in George  Ruben, "Observations  of Wage  Developments  in Manufacturing 
during 1959-78,"  Current Wage Developments,  vol. 33 (May 1981), pp. 47-59. 188  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Similarly,  in nonmanufacturing,  it would  take  at least a decade  of union- 
nonunion  wage growth differences of the dimensions  observed in the 
late 1970s  to restore  the union  relative  wage that  existed at the beginning 
of 1980. 
What is behind the unusually rapid recent deceleration in union 
wages? In an accounting sense, observed union wage behavior  in any 
period reflects the weighted outcome of three components of union 
wages: (1) first-year  wage changes negotiated  in recent collective bar- 
gaining agreements, (2) deferred, fixed wage increases specified in 
contracts  negotiated  one or two years  earlier,  and  (3)  COLAs  contingent 
upon  the behavior  of prices  and  the details  of the negotiated  formula  that 
translates changes in consumer prices into wage adjustments. (The 
weights-the  proportion  of union workers receiving each type of in- 
crease-vary  with the cycle of light  and  heavy bargaining  years.) 
The behavior  of these three components  is traditionally  described  in 
the following way. First-year negotiated wage changes are about as 
sensitive to unemployment  as nonunion  wage changes. However, the 
responsiveness of first-year  increases is muted by the rigidities  intro- 
duced by fixed, deferred increases. In addition, the combination  of 
COLA clauses and adjustments  to anticipated  price increases  built  into 
fixed  wage increases  renders  average  union  wages more  responsive  than 
nonunion  wages to price changes.6  This behavior  appears  to have been 
altered  somewhat  in  the early 1980s,  but  to understand  how this  occurred 
one must examine the three components of union wage adjustments. 
The ECI provides no information  on these, but the BLS series on 
effective union wage adjustments  does (see table 1). In the aggregate, 
this series parallels  the ECI union  wage change  data  but  extends back  to 
1968 for the private sector. The 4.0 percent increase in 1983 was a 
historical  low for the series. 
The effective union wage change is decomposed  into its three major 
components  in table 2 and the components  are graphed  in figure  1. For 
most of the period the data are closely in accord with the traditional 
story. In  particular,  there  is relatively  little  variance  in the deferred  union 
6.  See Robert  J. Flanagan,  "Wage Interdependence  in Unionized  Labor  Markets," 
BPEA,  3:1976,  pp. 635-73;  George  E. Johnson,  "The  Determination  of Wages  in  the Union 
and Non-union  Sectors,"  British Journal of Industrial Relations,  vol.  15 (July 1977), pp. 
211-25;  and Daniel  J. B. Mitchell, Unions, Wages,  and Inflation  (Brookings  Institution, 
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Table  2. Components  of Effective  Union  Wage  Adjustments,  1969-83 
Percentage  points of total adjustment  Total  attributable  to componentsa 
adjustment 
(percent  Current  Prior  Cost-of-living 
Year  change)  settlements  settlements  adjustments 
1969  6.5  2.4 (36.9)  3.8 (58.5)  0.3  (4.6) 
1970  8.8  5.1 (55.4)  3.1 (33.7)  0.6  (6.5) 
1971  9.2  4.3 (46.7)  4.2 (45.7)  0.7  (7.6) 
1972  6.6  1.7 (25.8)  4.2 (63.6)  0.7 (10.6) 
1973  7.0  3.0 (42.8)  2.7 (38.6)  1.3 (18.5) 
1974  9.4  4.8 (51.1)  2.6 (27.7)  1.9 (20.2) 
1975  8.7  2.8 (32.2)  3.7 (42.5)  2.2 (25.3) 
1976  8.1  3.2 (39.5)  3.2 (39.5)  1.6 (19.8) 
1977  8.0  3.0 (37.5)  3.2 (40.0)  1.7 (21.2) 
1978  8.2  2.0 (24.4)  3.7 (45.1)  2.4 (29.3) 
1979  9.1  3.0 (33.0)  3.0 (33.0)  3.1 (34.1) 
1980  9.9  3.6 (36.4)  3.5 (35.4)  2.8 (28.3) 
1981  9.5  2.5 (26.3)  3.8 (40.0)  3.2 (33.7) 
1982  6.8  1.7 (25.0)  3.6 (52.9)  1.4 (20.5) 
1983  4.0  0.8 (20.0)  2.5 (62.5)  0.6 (15.0) 
Source:  Current Wage Developments,  various issues. 
a.  Share of total adjustment in parentheses. 
wage component,  which often moves counter  to first-year  increases  and 
mutes  the aggregate  response  of union  wages. The drag  on the flexibility 
of union wage adjustments  created by deferred increases from prior 
settlements  is evident in the unusually  high contribution  of prior  settle- 
ments to total effective wage changes in years in which the latter drop 
sharply  (1972, 1982).  The most dramatic  secular  feature  of the data  is the 
rise in the relative importance of COLA clauses during the 1970s. 
Accounting  for less than 5 percent  of effective wage changes in the late 
1960s,  the contribution  of COLAs  increased  rapidly  in the early 1970s  to 
about  one-fifth  of the change and then again  around  1977-78  to account 
for about one-third  of wage changes received by union workers  before 
the trend  was reversed  in 1982  and 1983. 
The current  deceleration  illustrates  the complex interplay  among  the 
three components of union wages. Effective union wage gains peaked 
with  the current  settlements  component  in 1980.  Between 1980  and 1981, 
however, the sharp  1.1 percentage  point  drop  in the contribution  of first- 
year increases was largely  neutralized  by the continued  acceleration  of 
payments  under  deferred  increases and COLAs. Only after 1981,  when 190  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Figure 1.  Components of Effective Union Wage Changes,  1969-83 
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COLAs and, eventually, deferred  increases  began  to decline, was there 
a substantial  deceleration  in the total. 
A closer examination  of the 1980-81  changes  provides  an interesting 
illustration  of the effects of the contract  cycle on aggregate  union wage 
behavior. Between 1980  and 1981  the actual percentage  wage changes 
received under  each of the three categories of union wage adjustments 
moved in the opposite direction  of the contribution  of each category  to 
the total wage adjustment  shown in table 2. The increase in first-year 
wage  increases  can  be seen in  table  3, which  is discussed  more  extensively 
in the next section. Table 2, however, shows that the movement  of the 
individual  components  of effective union  wage change  were dominated 
by shifts in the proportions  of union workers receiving each type of 
increase between 1980  (a relatively  heavy bargaining  year) and 1981  (a 
relatively  light  bargaining  year). Although  wage changes  in the first  year Robert J. Flanagan  191 
of new agreements increased between 1980 and 1981 (table 3), the 
proportion  of union workers receiving such increases declined by a 
proportionately  larger  amount,  pulling  down the overall  contribution  of 
first-year  increases to effective wages (table  2). Similarly,  the increased 
contribution  of deferred and COLA payments (where the percentage 
increase actually declined) was raised by the increased proportion  of 
union  workers  receiving such payments.  Therefore,  union  wages began 
to fall sooner (in relation to the rise in unemployment)  in the recent 
recession than they had in past recessions largely because of  the 
fortuitous  timing  of the bargaining  cycle. 
The 1982-83 deceleration  in union wage gains differs  from previous 
ones primarily  in (1)  the origin  and  extent of the decline  in first-year  wage 
increases  and  (2) the large  drop  in the COLA  component.  While  conces- 
sion bargaining  played a role in each, the evidence suggests the results 
are unlikely  to be durable. 
FIRST-YEAR  INCREASES 
The dramatic deceleration of first-year  union wage increases that 
initiated  the fall in union wage increases in the early 1980s  reflects  both 
the spread of unprecedented  concessions and a general  moderation  of 
negotiated  pay increases  in industries  where  concessions were  not made. 
Both the extent and nature  of wage concessions has changed  since the 
bargaining  at Chrysler in  1979. Not  only has the number of wage 
concessions expanded considerably, but the alterations  in union con- 
tracts have become more dramatic.  While early concessions tended to 
establish wage deferrals, there was a movement toward wage freezes 
and  even wage  cuts in  later  negotiations.  There  has  also been  a substantial 
increase in deferral  or diversion of COLA payments over the period, 
which  will  be discussed  further  below. The  impact  of these developments 
on first-year  wage settlements  can be seen in table  3.7 
Wage decreases were essentially unheard of in major collective 
bargaining  agreements  until 1981.  Two years  later,  a third  of the workers 
in manufacturing  covered by new agreements  experienced  wage reduc- 
tions. Settlements  in the steel, airline,  and  meatpacking  industries  during 
7. In several  instances,  bargaining  over  concessions  was initiated  by reopening  a labor 
contract  before its scheduled  expiration  date. Since 1981,  contracts  resulting  from such 
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Table  3. Distribution  of Selected  First-Year  Wage  Adjustments  in Major  Private-Sector 
Collective  Bargaining  Agreements,  1970-83 
Percent of unionized  private-sector  workers 
1970-79 
Wage  adjustment  (average)  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Decrease 
Total  0  0  5.0  2.0  15.0 
Manufacturing  0  0  9.0  2.0  32.0 
Nonmanufacturing  0  0  2.0  2.0  7.0 
Construction  Oa  0  1.0  4.0  13.0 
No change 
Total  2.0  0  3.0  42.0  22.0 
Manufacturing  1.0  0  4.0  50.0  24.0 
Nonmanufacturing  4.0  0  2.0  33.0  20.0 
Construction  4.Oa  0  0  10.0  43.0 
Increase of 10 
percent or more 
Total  31.0  35.0  63.0  8.0  5.0 
Manufacturing  27.0  26.0  47.0  2.0  5.0 
Nonmanufacturing  35.0  44.0  71.0  13.0  4.0 
Construction  22.Oa  79.0  76.0  20.0  4.0 
Addendum:  Mean 
adjustment  (percent) 
Total  8.8  9.5  9.7  3.8  2.6 
Manufacturing  8.2  7.4  7.2  2.8  0.3 
Nonmanufacturing  9.2  10.9  11.2  4.8  3.8 
Construction  8.8  13.6  13.5  6.5  1.5 
Source:  Current Wage Developments,  various  issues. 
a. Average  for 1973-79. 
1983 have called for first-year  wage reductions  ranging  from 10 to 20 
percent. Indeed, under  the impact  of the steel agreement  in early 1983, 
the median  wage adjustment  in 1983  for all major  collective bargaining 
agreements  was a negative  3.7 percent  in the first  quarter  of 1983.  Wage 
freezes in collective bargaining  settlements  were also rare  before 1982; 
yet in that  year half  of the first-year  settlements  in major  manufacturing 
collective  bargaining agreements provided for  no  wage  change. 
The decline in the proportion  of manufacturing  workers under new 
agreements  providing  for wage freezes in 1983  was more than  offset by 
the increase in the proportion  receiving  wage reductions.  By 1983  wage 
freezes or reductions  also applied  to more  than  half  the workers  covered 
by new agreements  in the construction  industry.  All told, first-year  wage Robert J. Flanagan  193 
concessions granted  in major  private-sector  collective bargaining  agree- 
ments  renegotiated  in 1982  and 1983  applied  to approximately  40 percent 
(2.6 million)  of the workers covered by such agreements.8  More than 
half  of the workers  in large  bargaining  units in manufacturing  appear  to 
be subject  to concessions. Many of the contracts  providing  for freezes 
or reductions  in the first  year provide  for pay increases in later years of 
the contract. As will become apparent  below, however, some of these 
future  increases are contingent  on the future  performance  of the firms  in 
which  union  workers  are employed. 
The objectives of both labor and management  are important in 
determining  the strife and outcomes of collective bargaining.  Although 
employers  in several industries  were pushed  by increasing  competition 
to reduce  labor  costs, it is clear  from  the recent  record  on strike  activity 
that  the wage concessions occurred  in an environment  of reduced  union 
militancy.  If union  militancy  had  remained  unchanged,  efforts  to cut pay 
would have been accompanied  by an increase  in strike  activity. Instead, 
work stoppages  have been at postwar  lows since 1981.  In 1981  the BLS 
reported  2,577 work stoppages  involving  six or more  workers.9  One has 
to go back to the late 1930s,  when the extent of union organization  was 
much smaller  than  it is now, to find  years in which  work stoppages  were 
this low. Because of budget reductions, the scope of the series was 
limited  to stoppages  involving 1,000  or more  workers  beginning  in 1982. 
For 1981, 1982, and 1983, the respective number  of work stoppages 
reported  in this series is 145, 96, and 81. Again, figures  this low had not 
been recorded  for this series since the late 1930s.  10 
It is important  to note that  there  is considerable  variation  in effective 
union wage changes around  the deceleration  in the average. The most 
dramatic  concessions have been limited to a few major industries- 
automobiles, steel, rubber, airlines, railroads,  trucking,  meatpacking, 
8. Interestingly,  on the basis of a more detailed examination  of individual  labor 
agreements  signed  between 1979  and 1982,  Kosters  arrives  at an almost  identical  estimate 
(2.5  million)  of the number  of workers  in major  agreements  subject  to concessions  (defined 
as wage and benefit decisions involving reductions, no change, deferrals, or smaller 
increases than would have been provided under previous contractual  pay formulas). 
Kosters, "Disinflation  in the Labor  Market,"  p. 269. 
9. Although  the work stoppage  data technically  include employer  lockouts of their 
employees,  the latter  constitute  a very small  proportion  of total stoppages. 
10. Data are from Current  Wage  Developments,  vol. 34 (February  1982),  pp. 17-19, 
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supermarkets,  and construction.  The product  market  pressures  experi- 
enced in these industries, with the exception of construction, are not 
fundamentally  cyclical. During  the 1970s, some of the industries  came 
under  increased  pressure from international  competition,  a factor that 
was intensified  in the early 1980s  with the overvaluation  of the dollar.  In 
addition,  deregulation  reduced  barriers  to entry  in  the  airlines  and  surface 
transportation.  In the meatpacking  industry,  new nonunion  plants  with 
advanced  technology challenged  the markets  of older, high-cost,  union- 
ized plants. Each of these developments  would have placed unions in 
the affected industries  under considerable  pressure  to proffer  conces- 
sions that would reduce unit labor costs even in the absence of the 
recession.  1  The result  of the uneven  impact  of product  market  pressures 
was that at a time when the median  union  worker  in manufacturing  was 
experiencing  no change  in wage, some workers  were receiving  first-year 
increases in excess of 10 percent (table 3). While the upper tail of the 
wage-change  distribution  seemed to collapse in 1982  as settlements  in 
excess  of  10 percent all but disappeared  outside of construction, it 
nevertheless dropped less rapidly than the median, and the overall 
dispersion  of wage  changes  increased.  Of  those receiving  wage  decreases 
in manufacturing  (nonmanufacturing)  in 1983,  for example, the median 
decrease  was - 6.6 percent  (-  4.0 percent).  On  the other  hand,  for those 
receiving  an increase, the median  was 5.2 percent  (5.8 percent). 
The dispersion  in union wage adjustments  both recently and during 
the 1970s contradicts the view that a few key settlements are widely 
imitated  throughout  the economy. While some patterns  persisted  (even 
in  granting  concessions) where  one would  most  expect to observe  them- 
among  firms  competing  in the same product  markets-there were drop- 
outs of the most severely afflicted  firms  from  the historical  pattern  (such 
as Chrysler in the automobile industry), and effective patterns were 
further  diminished  by the adoption of profit-sharing  plans (discussed 
below). In addition,  the effective union wage change data confirms  the 
earlier  implication  in the ECI data that the union wage deceleration  is 
not  uniform  but  has  been concentrated  in manufacturing.  Effective  union 
wage changes in that sector moved from 5.2 percent in 1982 to 2.6 
11. For  an estimate  of the effect of import  penetration  on the probability  of concession 
bargaining,  see Peter  Cappelli,  "Concession  Bargaining  and  the National  Economy,"  35th 
Annual  Proceedings  of the Industrial  Relations  Research  Association  (IRRA, 1983),  pp. 
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Table  4. Distribution  of Selected  First-Year  Wage  and Compensation  Adjustments 
in State  and Local  Government  Collective  Bargaining  Agreements,  1979-83 
Percent of workers 
by size of settlementa 
Increase of  Mean  Median 
10 percent  adjustment  adjustment 
Year  No change  or more  (percent)  (percent) 
1979 
Wage  4.0  8.0  6.8  7.0 
Compensation  0.0  7.0  7.0  6.8 
1980 
Wage  10.0  12.0  7.5  8.0 
Compensation  3.0  7.0  7.3  7.6 
1981 
Wage  9.0  21.0  7.4  8.0 
Compensation  2.0  21.0  7.8  7.7 
1982 
Wage  12.0  11.0  7.2  8.0 
Compensation  10.0  12.0  7.4  7.7 
1983 
Wage  21.0  0.0  4.4  5.0 
Compensation  2.0  0.0  4.6  5.0 
Source:  BLS, "State  and Local Collective  Bargaining  Settlements,  1983,"  News,  February  23, 1984. 
a. There  were no significant  wage  decreases  in state  and  local  government  collective  bargaining  agreements  during 
this period. 
percent in 1983  but only from 7.8 to 6.9 percent  in services. Moreover, 
the continual increase in the union-nonunion  wage differential  during 
the 1970s indicates the limited influence of union agreements in the 
nonunion  sector. 
No parallel  deceleration  of wages and  benefits  is discernible  in public- 
sector  collective bargaining  until  1983.  Since 1979,  the BLS has  published 
data on wage and benefit changes in collective bargaining  agreements 
covering at least 5,000 state and local government  employees (about  a 
quarter  of all such workers  covered by such agreements).  Data on first- 
year wage and compensation  changes appear  in table 4. There are no 
instances of wage reductions.  There has been a gradual  increase in the 
share  of these workers  receiving  no change  in wages or benefits,  but  this 
share  remains  well below that observed  in the private  sector. 
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changes  than  the private  sector during  the period  is the fact that  COLAs 
were eliminated  from major  public-sector  labor agreements  during  the 
early 1980s  in exchange  for larger  fixed-wage  increases. In 1979  sixteen 
major  agreements  had COLAs, covering  about  a quarter  of the workers 
in state and local government  bargaining  units with more than 5,000 
workers.  By the end of 1983  only one remained  in effect (covering  about 
1 percent  of the workers  in such units). 
Contingent Compensation 
The deceleration  of first-year  wage adjustments  in the early 1980s  has 
been dramatic,  but in large measure  is more an extension than a break 
with past union wage behavior. As already noted, this part of union 
wages has always been sensitive to the economic environment,  and if a 
system of fixed (noncontingent)  wage changes is maintained,  first-year 
wage increases in industries  where concessions have been granted  will 
in all likelihood accelerate if and when profitability  is restored. It has 
been through  contractual  devices such as COLAs and annual  improve- 
ment  factors  that  union  wages have resisted  downward  pressure,  moved 
up with inflation, and grown relative to nonunion wages. And it is 
contractual  alterations  in the means by which union wages adjust to 
contingencies that hold the most promise for greater  macroeconomic 
wage flexibility  and  a reduction  in the union-nonunion  wage gap. In this 
section, we examine  the extent to which such alterations  have occurred 
in recent concession bargaining. 
While  the most obvious structural  adjustment  to greater  uncertainty 
is to negotiate more frequently,  labor and management  have generally 
abandoned  this option during  the postwar period on the grounds  that 
negotiating costs,  including the probability  of strikes, rise with the 
frequency of negotiations. There has been no discernible tendency 
toward this option during  the recent wave of concession negotiations. 
The average duration  of major  private-sector  labor  agreements  negoti- 
ated in 1982  and 1983  was 31 and 32 months, respectively, only slightly 
below the peak of 33.4 months in 1979  and at about the average of the 
1970s. 
Within  the regime of long-term  labor agreements, the parties have 
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wage increases  and  COLAs  providing  wage payments  dependent  on the 
movement  of a general  price index. The drag  imposed  on general  union 
money wage movements by these mechanisms was evident in data 
reviewed in the previous section. Thus, one of the more important 
questions  for future  union wage behavior  is the extent to which conces- 
sion bargaining  has altered  or found  substitutes  for COLAs  and  noncon- 
tingent deferred wage increases in the later years of long-term  labor 
agreements. 
COLA  ADJUSTMENTS 
The first section showed that after a decade of increase, there was a 
sharp  decline in effective union wage increases attributable  to COLAs. 
Here I examine  whether  this development  was caused by changes  in the 
tendency of unions and management  to index part of compensation  to 
general  price  movements,  or was simply  a byproduct  of the general  price 
deceleration. 
In an accounting  sense, the observed contribution  of COLAs, wc,  to 
total effective union wage changes has three components: (1) the 
proportion  of union workers  covered by COLAs, a, (2) the proportion 
of price  change  provided  as compensation  to workers  covered  by COLA 
formulas (degree of compensation), k, and (3) the rate of change in 
consumer prices, p.  The contribution  of COLAs to effective wage 
changes  can be roughly  expressed by the following  equation:  wc = akp. 
(In practice, the nature  of most COLA formulas  results in a nonlinear 
relationship  between k  and  p.)12 
Historical  data  on these components  of COLA  are presented  in table 
5. Note first  that the growth  in the COLA  component  of effective union 
12. Thus  the major  contractual  changes  that might  contribute  to the recent  decline  in 
the contribution  of COLAs to effective wage changes  are a decline in the proportion  of 
workers covered by COLAs, or a change in the degree to which COLA formulas 
compensate  workers  for price  changes,  or both. Among  the sources  of nonlinearity  in the 
compensation  parameter  are the fact that most COLA  formulas  provide  for equal  cents- 
per-hour  increases  for  a fixed  percentage  point  change  in  the  reference  price  index,  changes 
in the mix of review periods,  and  the existence of caps and  floors  in the COLA  formulas. 
More  than  20 percent  of the COLAs have caps, a proportion  that is little changed  since 
1978.  Caps  were found in about two-thirds  of the COLA  arrangements  in the late 1960s 
but  were  rapidly  dropped  from  collective bargaining  agreements  during  the inflation  of the 
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Table 5.  Decomposition of Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) Component of 
Effective Annual Wage Changes,  1968-83 
Percent 
Wage  change  Unionized  work- 
due to COLAs,  ers covered by  Degree of com-  Price 
Year  wc  COLAs,  a  pensation,a  k  change,b  p 
1968  n.a.  23.6  n.a.  4.7 
1969  0.3  25.0  n.a.  6.1 
1970  0.6  25.9  n.a.  5.5 
1971  0.7  27.8  n.a.  3.4 
1972  0.7  40.6  n.a.  3.4 
1973  1.3  39.4  n.a.  8.8 
1974  1.9  39.2  n.a.  12.2 
1975  2.2  51.5  n.a.  7.0 
1976  1.6  59.4  n.a.  4.8 
1977  1.7  61.2  n.a.  6.8 
1978  2.4  60.4  n.a.  9.0 
1979  3.1  58.9  n.a.  13.3 
1980  2.8  58.1  n.a.  12.4 
1981  3.2  58.2  67.0  8.9 
1982  1.4  56.7  70.0  3.9 
1983  0.6  57.6  53.0  3.8 
Source:  COLA  wage change  and degree  of compensation  are from  Cuirrent Wage  Developments,  various  issues; 
COLA  coverage  is from  Monthly  Labor  Review,  vol. 106  (January  1983),  p. 11, and previous  January  issues; price 
change is from Economic  Report  of the President,  February  1984, p. 283. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Proportion  of price  change  provided  as compensation  to workers  covered  by COLAs. 
b. December-to-December  change  in CPI-U. 
wage changes recorded  in table 2 and figure  1 reflects a combination  of 
increasing  inflation  and expanding  COLA coverage during  the first  half 
of the 1970s;  from 1977  (when COLA  coverage peaked)  through  1981  it 
reflected  the acceleration  of inflation  alone.13 Second, the recent decel- 
eration in the role of COLAs in union wage adjustments  cannot be 
attributed to  a tendency for union workers to give up the COLA 
provisions of  their collective bargaining  agreements. The coverage 
proportion,  a, has remained  in the region  of 60 percent since 1976.  Nor 
has there been a general tendency to give up COLAs in industries  in 
which the most substantial  wage concessions have been negotiated. 
Data on the extent of COLA  coverage  in these industries  in recent  years 
13. Data on the degree of compensation  are not available  until 1981  and are not as 
easily computed.  Rough  estimates  indicate  that  this parameter  did not vary  much  during 
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Table  6. Percent  of Union  Workers  Covered  by Cost-of-Living  Adjustment  Clauses, 
Selected  Industries,  1979-83a 
Industry  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
All industries  59  58  58  57  58 
Building  construction  2  7  7  7  9 
Food products  36  32  31  50  44 
Rubber  and plastic  88  82  92  90  89 
Primary  metals  96  95  95  96  95 
Transportation  equipment  94  94  87  87  94 
Motor  freight  transportation  98  98  99  100  100 
Transportation  by air  72  79  70  40  13 
Food stores  71  63  39  38  19 
Source:  Monthly  Labor  Review,  vol. 107  (January  1984),  p. 30, and previous  January  issues. 
a. Contracts  covering  1,000  or more  workers. 
appear  in table 6. Although  COLA coverage is extensive in several of 
these industries, the only substantial  abandonment  of COLAs that is 
discernible  during  the recent period of concession bargaining  is in the 
airlines  and in food stores. Whatever  the pressures  on recent collective 
bargaining,  they have not led workers  to give up the basic contractual 
provisions  indexing  wages to movements  in the general  price  index. 
Instead, several unions have agreed to temporarily  forgo or defer 
COLA  payments,  to reduce  the frequency  of review  periods,  or to divert 
some of the accrued  payments  to other purposes, such as maintenance 
of certain  fringe  benefits. In addition,  there has been some tendency to 
lengthen  the period between COLA reviews. Between 1981  and 1983, 
the share  of indexed workers  that  had  a COLA  review scheduled  during 
the year declined  from 68 percent to 59 percent, but in 1984,  86 percent 
of the workers  are scheduled  for a review. Relative  to the early 1980s,  a 
higher  proportion  of COLA  contracts  provide  for  (less expensive)  annual 
reviews  and  a lower proportion  for quarterly  or semiannual  reviews, but 
these proportions  are similar  to those in effect in 1978.  The impact of 
these  largely  temporary  adjustments  should  be on the degree  of compen- 
sation. 
The degree of compensation  (k in the equation  above) is difficult  to 
derive, since it reflects the different review periods established in 
different  collective bargaining  agreements  as well as the specific char- 
acteristics  of the COLA formula,  such as floors and ceilings. As noted 
above, the compensation  parameter  is unlikely to be linear in prices. 
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COLA  formulas  in  major  collective bargaining  agreements  and  the actual 
reference  periods  used in determining  COLA  payments  since 1981  (table 
5). These data  reflect  only COLA  provisions  and  therefore  do not  include 
compensation  for price increases that may be embedded  in fixed wage 
increases. By the early 1980s, COLAs compensated on average for 
about  two-thirds  of changes in the CPI. In 1983,  however, the compen- 
sation provided by adjustments  from COLA clauses dropped  to little 
more than half of changes in the CPI. This change reflects the largely 
one-time alterations in COLA payments noted above as well as the 
possibly more permanent  alterations  in review periods  and  price move- 
ments  that  were too small  to trigger  COLA  payments.  The  basic structure 
of most COLA formulas  has not been altered substantially  during  the 
period  of concession bargaining. 
The evidence indicates  that  the deceleration  in the COLA  component 
of union wage adjustments  in the early 1980s  was initially  and mainly  a 
result  of the deceleration  of the CPI.  Later,  and  of secondary  importance, 
specific, one-time concessions achieved a temporary  reduction  in the 
degree of  compensation provided by COLAs to workers in a few 
industries in extreme economic distress. Nevertheless, the pressures 
that  have stimulated  wage concessions have not significantly  altered  the 
contractual  methods by which management  and labor address future 
price uncertainty.  COLA  clauses have been eliminated  from  only a few 
major  agreements  in the private sector, and these changes have essen- 
tially been offset by the adoption of  new COLA clauses in other 
bargaining  relationships. Moreover, there has been little tendency to 
renegotiate  the parameters  of COLA  formulas.  Even in those industries 
in which the most substantial  concessions have been negotiated,  basic 
structural  changes in COLAs have not usually been an element of the 
concession package. Therefore,  there is little reason to expect that the 
role of COLAs  in union  wage determination  will be substantially  altered 
in the near  future.  14 
14. Whether  there  is a reduction  in COLA  coverage  over the longer  term  depends  on 
a difficult-to-forecast  set of factors including  uncertainty  concerning  expected inflation 
rates, the degree  of unexpected  inflation,  the sensitivity  of asset values to price  changes, 
and  the change  in a firm's  value added  with respect  to general  price  changes.  See Ronald 
G. Ehrenberg,  Leif  Danziger,  and  Gee San, "Cost-of-Living  Adjustment  Clauses  in Union 
Contracts:  A Summary  of Results," Journal  of Labor  Economics,  vol. 1 (July 1983),  pp. 
215-45;  Wallace  E. Hendricks  and  Lawrence  M. Kahn,  "Cost-of-Living  Clauses  in Union 
Contracts: Determinants  and Effects,"  Industrial and Labor Relations  Review,  vol.  36 Robert J. Flanagan  201 
INDEXING  COMPENSATION  TO  COMPANY  PERFORMANCE 
In recent years, several economists have noted the desirable  macro- 
economic  properties  of indexing  compensation  to some measure  of firm 
performance  and have suggested that an answer to stagflation  is to be 
found in a revision of compensation systems.'5 Institutional  arrange- 
ments with this character  include  indexing  wages to output  price, profit 
sharing,  employee stock ownership  plans,  and  the ultimate  in such  plans, 
employee ownership  of the firm. 
Such compensation arrangements  are logically distinct from the 
worker  participation  or codetermination  plans, common  in many  Euro- 
pean countries, which provide  for employee representation  on supervi- 
sory boards and works councils; as will become apparent  below, how- 
ever,  there  are  reasons  to expect  complementarities  between  performance- 
based compensation  schemes and  participation  arrangements. 
Compensation  systems that link pay to the performance  of the firm 
also have the potential  for producing  long-run  productivity  gains  for the 
firm. With pay linked to the profitability  of the firm, workers have a 
general incentive to increase effort, relax or abandon  restrictive  work 
rules, and take other actions that contribute to the efficiency of the 
firm.  The strength  of these incentives generally  depends on the size of 
the organization and on the specific structure of the compensation 
system. One recurrent  difficulty with actually realizing the potential 
gains is that performance-based  compensation  arrangements  have im- 
portant  public-good  characteristics,  with  a consequent  potential  for  free- 
rider behavior. As a result, some performance-based  systems may 
significantly  increase short-run  wage flexibility  without  having  much  of 
an impact  on the long-run  efficiency  of organizations. 
American  unions  and  management  have been reluctant  historically  to 
(April 1983), pp. 447-60; and Jean-Michel  Cousineau, Robert Lacroix, and Danielle 
Bilodeau,  "The Determination  of Escalator  Clauses  in Collective  Agreements,"  Review 
of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 65 (May 1983), pp. 196-202. 
15. See, for example, Martin  L. Weitzman,  "Some Macroeconomic  Implications  of 
Alternative  Compensation  Systems," Economic  Journal, vol. 93 (December  1983),  pp. 
763-83; James E.  Meade, "The Adjustment  Process of Labour Co-operatives  with 
Constant  Returns  to Scale and  Perfect  Competition,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 89 (Decem- 
ber 1979),  pp. 781-88; and James E. Meade, Stagflation,  vol. 1: Wage  Fixing (London: 
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index the compensation  of union members  to the fortunes  of the firms 
that employ them, through  profit  sharing  or stock ownership.  16 On the 
union side, such arrangements  conflict with several traditional  objec- 
tives.  With interfirm  variations in performance,  for example, these 
compensation  systems thwart  the basic union goal of "taking  the wage 
out of competition" and break whatever intra- and interunion  wage 
patterns  may  have developed  as part  of an effort  to secure  this objective. 
Indexing to firm  performance  also creates more uncertainty  over real 
income than does the more traditional  indexation  of compensation  to a 
general  price index. Unless the firm's  performance  is closely correlated 
with the general price index, a COLA will provide a greater  degree of 
real  wage insurance. 
Faced with these uncertainties, the median union voter, whose 
preferences determine the nature of the labor contract that will be 
ratified,  is unlikely  to support  performance-based  compensation  systems 
in  normal  times. Protected  by seniority  arrangements  from  layoffs  during 
moderate cyclical fluctuations, the median union voter recognizes a 
fixed-wage  policy for what it is-a  fixed (nominal)  income policy for all 
but the least senior workers. When  major  secular  or cyclical economic 
developments result in plant closings and layoffs that threaten the 
employment  and earnings  of even the median  voter, however, perfor- 
mance-based  compensation  arrangements  that might  mitigate  expected 
income losses may be considered  in a new light. 
Developments  in labor  contracts  during  the early 1980s  are  consistent 
with  this  view of union  decisionmaking.  Various  arrangements  that  index 
compensation to the fortunes of the firm have been a feature in the 
concession bargaining  of the early 1980s.  However, neither  the indexing 
nor the wage concessions for which it is often a quid pro quo has 
been a general  phenomenon.  As the median-voter  model  would  predict, 
16. In 1980,  for example, only 1 percent  of major  collective bargaining  agreements  in 
the private  sector included  profit-sharing  plans  as part  of worker  compensation.  Another 
2 percent  of the agreements  provided  for employee stock ownership  plans under  which 
workers  could purchase  shares of company  stock, usually  under  more favorable  terms 
than are available  on the open market. Fewer than 200,000  workers  were covered by 
agreements with such plans. BLS,  Characteristics  of Major Collective Bargaining Agree- 
ments, January  1, 1980, Bulletin  2095 (Government  Printing  Office, 1981).  In a broader 
sample  of large and medium-size  firms  in 1980, 13 percent  of production  workers  were 
eligible  to participate  in profit  sharing  and  24 percent  were  eligible  to participate  in various 
stock-ownership  plans. Separate  percentages  for union and nonunion  workers  were not 
available. BLS, Employee Benefits in Industry, 1980, Bulletin 2107 (GPO, 1981), p. 31. Robert J. Flanagan  203 
they are concentrated  in the industries that were subject to extreme 
product  market  pressures (such as autos, steel, airlines, meatpacking, 
and  rubber).  I will  review  the main  features  of some  of the  more  important 
types of performance-based  compensation  arrangements  negotiated  by 
unions  in recent years because of their  potential  importance  for greater 
wage flexibility  and  greater  long-run  efficiency. 
Profit Sharing. Profit sharing  has been the main approach  to per- 
formance-based  compensation negotiated by unions in recent years. 
Most of the plans require the firm to earn a certain minimum  annual 
return  (MAR),  usually  based on pretax  profits,  before  the profit-sharing 
features of the compensation  package are invoked. Once the MAR is 
reached,  the key features  of the plans  are those determining  (1) how the 
pool of profits  available  for sharing  is determined  and  (2) how the pool is 
to be distributed  among  eligible  individuals.  17 These features  determine 
the plan's potential  for creating  wage flexibility  and  efficiency. 
Only a few of the recently negotiated plans provide profit sharing 
from the first dollar  of profits. Instead, most plans provide that pretax 
profits  must reach a contractually  specified  MAR-variously defined  as 
a percentage  of sales (the UAW-Ford  Motor  Company  agreement),  sales 
plus net worth (the UAW-Caterpillar  Tractor  Company  agreement),  or 
net worth  plus liabilities  (the UAW-General  Motors  Corporation  agree- 
ment). While the MAR delays the point at which wages increase in 
response  to profits,  it also limits  the  extent  to which  wages  fall  in  response 
to cyclical reductions  in profits. 
To fund the profit-sharing  pools, several recent agreements  call for 
allocating a fraction of pretax profits above the MAR to a pool for 
distribution  to workers.  Some plans  use a fixed  fraction  and  others  (such 
as UAW-Ford)  use a tiered  approach,  in which the percentage  of profits 
available  for distribution  to employees increases  in steps with the profit 
rate  earned  by the company. 
Other  contracts  take  a "deferred  entitlement"  approach,  in which  the 
amount  that may be returned  to workers from profits is equal to the 
amount  of their  earlier  wage concessions. Under  this approach,  taken  in 
the agreement between the United Steelworkers and the Wheeling- 
Pittsburgh  Steel Corporation,  wages forgone by workers are in effect 
"loaned" to the company. Workers  receive a contractual  right to the 
17. Most  of the plans  distribute  the proceeds  in cash, although  some  allow  workers  the 
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amount  of their  wage concession and  are in effect placed  in the position 
of preferred  stockholders.  The funds  available  for redistribution  may  be 
created by profits in excess of MAR, but the total available  for profit 
sharing  is limited by the amount of the initial concessions. While the 
arrangement  may provide incentives for short-term  gains in efficiency 
to hasten the time at which the concessions are returned,  its long-term 
incentive  effects are dubious. 
Profit-sharing  plans recently negotiated  in the agricultural  and con- 
struction  equipment  industry  provide  an open-ended  fund. Indeed, the 
funding  and the distribution  are synonymous  in these cases once a firm 
exceeds the MAR:  workers  receive a cents-per-hours-worked  payment 
whose size depends on the firm's profit  rate. (In a similar  plan, pilots 
with Pan  American  World  Airways  will receive a 1  percent  pay increase 
for every $20 million of operating profit earned after interest.) This 
variant  is much  like a straight  bonus system. 
The mechanism for distributing  profit-sharing  funds to individual 
workers  in recent collective bargaining  agreements  typically  calls for a 
guaranteed  amount  plus a variable  payment. An interesting  feature of 
some of these plans  is the size of the guaranteed  payment  in the first  year 
of the agreement. In the farm and construction  equipment  industries, 
for example, the guarantees  are based on what the negotiated  profit- 
sharing  plans  would have yielded  if they had  been in effect during  1977- 
81. Profits  during  that  period  appear  to be larger  than  are likely to occur 
in  the first  year  of the current  plan.  Guarantees  in  the automobile  industry 
plans do not appear  to be as large. Nevertheless, at least for the first 
contract  year, some negotiated  profit-sharing  plans  appear  to have little 
to do with indexing compensation  to the current  fortunes of the firm. 
The large guarantees  convert them instead into another  form of fixed 
annual  improvement  factor. 
In agreements with a fixed rather than open-ended pool, eligible 
workers also receive a share of the pool that is equal to their share of 
hours  paid or compensation  received, depending  on the plan. The exact 
mechanism used for this variable payment has implications for the 
wage structure  and  for the future  pattern  of support  within  the union  for 
the profit-sharing  arrangement.  Consider  a plan  in which distribution  is 
based  solely on an  individual's  share  of hours  paid.  18  Different  individuals 
18. This is the distribution  formula  in the current  UAW-General  Motors  agreement, 
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paid for the same number  of hours will receive the same profit-sharing 
payment  in absolute terms, regardless  of their skill level or base rate. 
Like the historically common practice of negotiating  equal absolute 
wage increases  and structuring  COLAs  to provide  equal  cents-per-hour 
adjustments  for price changes, this distribution  mechanism tends to 
narrow  wage differentials  based on skill. Thus, the impact  of the profit- 
sharing  arrangement  is similar  to that of the fixed wage increases  that it 
supplants.  It also runs  counter  to the efforts  of some employers  to widen 
wage differentials  by skill in order to provide greater incentives for 
training.  A second characteristic  of a distribution  mechanism  based on 
a worker's share  of total hours  is that such incentive  effects as exist will 
be strongest for relatively low skilled workers, for whom the profit- 
sharing  component of compensation  is relatively large. By extension, 
free-rider  responses would be relatively  large  among  high-skilled  work- 
ers. For the same reason, the rank and file of unions adopting  profit- 
sharing  plans  with this particular  distribution  mechanism  are  likely  to be 
less unified  about the desirability  of retaining  the arrangement  in future 
negotiations.  Indeed, the likelihood  of retaining  the practice  will depend 
on the exact skill (wage)  distribution  of union  members. 
Consider  instead  a profit-sharing  plan  in which the fund  is distributed 
according  to an individual's  pro rata  share  of total compensation.  19  For 
a given number of hours of work, each worker will receive a profit- 
sharing  payment in proportion  to his or her wage rate and the profit- 
sharing component of compensation will not operate to narrow the 
structure.  In this instance, workers should have an equal stake in the 
profit-sharing  plan regardless of skill level, and the prospects for its 
retention  in the future  should  be higher. 
Negotiated Profit Sharing Plans and Union Wage Flexibility. The 
profit-sharing  arrangements  that have been negotiated  in several  indus- 
tries  in recent years have the potential  for increasing  the responsiveness 
of union  wages to the firm's  performance.  Nevertheless, several  factors 
are likely to limit the effect of the plans on aggregate union wage 
flexibility. 
First, the coverage of the plans, while much  broader  than  only a few 
years  ago, is limited  to the short  list of industries  noted  above, and  within 
these industries,  coverage  is not complete. I estimate  that  about  650,000 
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hourly workers are covered by profit-sharing  plans that have been 
established  in major  collective bargaining  agreements  since 1980,  raising 
the coverage  of such plans  to 8-10 percent  of workers  in large  bargaining 
units  by late 1983.  The share  of production  workers  covered was 75-80 
percent in the motor vehicles industry  and 25-30 percent in farm and 
construction equipment, the two industries where the largest profit- 
sharing  plans have been negotiated. (Salaried  nonproduction  workers 
were also covered by the plans in the two industries.)  Coverage  in steel 
and the airlines  was much  lower. Although  the number  of plans  in these 
industries has grown dramatically  (in each case there was almost no 
profit sharing in 1980), such plans will have to be adopted by other 
industries  if they are to influence  aggregate  compensation  significantly. 
It is not obvious that the incentives for interindustry  spillovers are 
strong. The way in which compensation based on firm performance 
interferes  with traditional  union objectives was discussed earlier. The 
recent competitive  pressures  on unions (such as from  trade  and  deregu- 
lation)  have developed on an industry  basis. There  is no clear pressure 
for interindustry  transmission.  While  general  wage settlements  have in 
the past often tended to spread  across industries  within  the domain  of a 
single union,20  there is little evidence that the performance-based  com- 
pensation  arrangements  are following  a similar  path. The UAW accepts 
arrangements  in autos but not in aerospace;  the USW accepts them in 
steel but not in aluminum.  In most instances the arrangements  do not 
even apply to all the firms within an industry. The UAW has profit- 
sharing  arrangements  with Ford and GM, but not with Chrysler  (whose 
workers  traded  a plan, negotiated  in 1981,  in exchange  for a fixed wage 
increase); the USW has negotiated plans with some of the smaller 
companies, but a proposed profit-sharing  arrangement  with the major 
steel firms that was recommended  by the union's executive board in 
December 1982 was rejected by the bargaining  council of local union 
presidents. A spillover of performance-based  compensation systems 
from  the union  to the nonunion  sector  also seems dubious.  The  nonunion 
sector already has a significant  labor cost advantage  after a decade of 
more  rapid  wage increases  in the union  sector. With  more  frequent  wage 
adjustments  and a greater  sensitivity of wages to unemployment,  com- 
pensation  systems in the nonunion  sector are already  more tightly tied 
(if only implicitly)  to firm  performance. 
20. See evidence  in Flanagan,  "Wage  Interdependence  in Unionized  Labor  Markets." Robert J. Flanagan  207 
A second limit on the plans' effect on wage flexibility is that, in 
industries  where plans  have been negotiated,  it is not obvious that  profit 
sharing  will become a large component  of compensation  changes in an 
inflationary  environment. As noted, there has been no tendency to 
abandon COLAs in recent years. While profit-sharing  arrangements 
might  mute  union  wage-push  (a  rare  phenomenon  in  the  past  two  decades) 
or the drag of union wages in a recession, price increases from other 
supply-side factors would continue to influence wages and the cost 
structure  and could dominate  profit  sharing  as an element  of compensa- 
tion. 
Third,  the guarantees  that  are  built  into the first  year  of several  profit- 
sharing  plans  limit  the  extent  to which  pay  is indexed  to firm  performance. 
Insofar  as the current  guarantees  are a "rebate"  on large  recent  conces- 
sions, however, they may become a less important  feature  of the plans 
in subsequent  negotiations. 
Finally, the scope of future  profit-sharing  arrangements  in industries 
where  they have been negotiated  is uncertain.  American  employers  have 
traditionally resisted profit-sharing  plans, except during periods of 
economic distress. Recently, however, at least one major  employer, 
General  Motors, has considered  the possibility  that  profits  would  be the 
main  basis for future  compensation.  On  the other  hand,  the UAW, which 
for years has advocated  profit  sharing  as an element  of the compensation 
package  that could "benefit  our members  and be a useful way to settle 
bargaining  disputes about the probable financial experience of  the 
company during the term of a collective bargaining  agreement," has 
stressed that profit-sharing  should  not be viewed as a substitute  for the 
traditional  formula  of a fixed annual  improvement  factor  plus COLA.21 
Employee Stock Ownership  and Worker  Participation. Employee 
stock ownership  plans (ESOPs)  also spread  during  concession bargain- 
ing in the early 1980s;  stock ownership  was offered by companies  as a 
full or partial offset to money wage concessions, including forgone 
21. The 1984 UAW collective bargaining  program  states: profit sharing "is not a 
substitute  for, or alternative  to, other wage or benefit  demands.  .  .  . Profits  (and profit 
sharing)  cannot  be the basis for wages, pensions and other benefits  that a worker  must 
have  reasonable  assurance  will be paid  on a regular  basis. Instead,  profit  sharing  can be a 
rational  way to provide equitable sharing  of a company's additional  productivity  and 
efficiencies  after the results of those are known and show up in its profits."  Within  this 
framework,  however, the UAW indicated  a willingness  to negotiate  new programs  and 
improve existing  plans.  UAW,  Resolution-1984  Collective  Bargaining  Program,  1984 
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COLA  payments.  For  example, 1  1,000  workers  represented  by the USW 
at the Wheeling-Pittsburgh  Steel Corporation  accepted shares of pre- 
ferred  stock in exchange for deferring  benefits. Members  of the Airline 
Pilots  Association  at Eastern  Airlines  agreed  to take 17.5  percent  of total 
pay in the form of subordinated  debentures  (paying  5 percent interest) 
that could at the employee's option later be converted into Eastern 
common stock. In some cases,  such arrangements  have resulted in 
employees owning  a substantial  fraction  of the company  and  effectively 
buying the company. Members  of the Food and Commercial  Workers 
Union at the Rath  Packing  Company,  for example, ended up owning  60 
percent  of the stock and acquiring  management  control. ESOPs, which 
are typically established  on a deferred  payment  basis, offer greater  tax 
advantages  to employers than do most negotiated  profit-sharing  plans. 
They  may  also offer  tax advantages  to some  high-income  union  members, 
since income earned  in an ESOP trust  is exempt  from  taxation  until  it is 
distributed.  Beyond these tax aspects, the considerations  governing  the 
spread  of profit-sharing  plans appear  to apply  to ESOPs.22 
Worker  participation  plans  have  generally  been opposed  by American 
unions  as devices that  blur  the respective  institutional  responsibilities  of 
labor  and management.  Even under  recent concession bargaining,  only 
isolated instances of worker  representation  on boards  of directors  have 
emerged.23  However, one would  expect that  the spread  of compensation 
arrangements  based on firm or company performance  would increase 
the demand  for union  representation  on such bodies. Concession  agree- 
ments that  index compensation  to performance  raise  problems  of moni- 
toring  and verification  that are not present  to the same degree  when the 
wage is  fixed or indexed to  public information, such as the CPI. 
Management  is likely to have better information  than the union on the 
performance  of the firm,  with consequent  ability  to behave opportunist- 
ically in the reporting  of data  that  will influence  future  compensation.  In 
order to reduce or eliminate this natural  asymmetry of information, 
22. Employers  may claim  a tax credit  for ESOP  contributions  up to 15  percent  of the 
annual compensation of  ESOP participants.  Negotiated profit-sharing  plans do not 
normally  provide  for deferred  payments  and hence can be deducted  only from income 
(like  other  current  wage  payments). 
23. The president  of the UAW was placed  on the board  of directors  of the Chrysler 
Corporation,  and a concession agreement  between some airline unions and Eastern 
Airlines  resulted  in  the appointment  of three  individuals  representing  unions  to the  airline's 
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unions would rationally  wish to combine performance-based  compen- 
sation systems with institutional  arrangements  that would increase a 
union's ability to verify the accuracy of key performance  measures. 
Participation  on board  of directors  is one such mechanism.24 
Changes in the Legal Environment  of Union-Management 
Relations 
The erosion of the economic influence  of unions  in the United States 
predated  the recent concession bargaining.  Union  penetration  of private 
employment peaked in the mid-1950s (well below the proportionate 
representation  achieved  by unions  in most other  Western  countries)  and 
has  been declining  ever since. Absolute  union  membership  has  decreased 
since 1978. Moreover, the decline in union membership  in the private 
sector has been only partially  offset by rapid  union  growth  in the public 
sector since the mid-1960s. 
Part  of the decline  in union  representation  in  the private  sector  reflects 
a shift in the industrial  mix of employment as jobs have moved from 
industries  of traditional  union strength-such as manufacturing,  trans- 
portation, and construction-to  industries  in which union penetration 
has historically been low,  such as services. Without changes in the 
extent of union organization by industry, these shifts alone would 
account  for some decline in aggregate  union  membership.  Union repre- 
sentation  has also decreased  within  most industries  in the private  sector, 
however. Shifts  in employment  from  blue-collar  to white-collarjobs  and 
from the northern  and eastern states to the southern states are only 
partially  associated  with  a changing  industrial  mix  of employment.  Some 
of the decline  in union  penetration  within  industries  also reflects  changes 
in the occupational and regional composition of employment. Again 
assuming  no changes in the extent of union organization  by occupation 
or by  region, the effects  of  shifts in occupational and geographic 
composition  that have occurred since the mid-1950s  have reduced the 
extent of  union organization within industries as well as  between 
industries. 
24. In discussing  profit  sharing,  the UAW notes that, "Particular  attention  must be 
paid  to safeguards  against  accounting  manipulation,  especially at smaller  privately  held 
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The increasing  difficulties  encountered  by unions in trying  to extend 
or maintain  theirjurisdiction  is further  signaled  by a drop  in their  success 
rate in elections run  by the National  Labor  Relations  Board  (NLRB) in 
which  employees  vote for  or  against  union  representation.  In 1950  unions 
won about  74.5 percent of these elections, but by 1981  the success rate 
had  dropped  to 45.4 percent.  At the same  time  there  has been an increase 
in the number  of decertification  elections (in  which  employees vote over 
whether or not to remove their  union as the legal bargaining  represen- 
tative), and the union success rate in these elections has declined 
from  33.0 percent  in 1950  to 25.1 percent  in 1981.  Developments  such as 
these have led unions  to attribute  some of their  declining  representation 
strength to the legal environment  of labor relations and to argue for 
revisions  in the National  Labor  Relations  Act (NLRA), the basic statute 
governing  labor  relations  in the United States. Judging  by the opposition 
mounted  by employers to relatively modest proposals  for revisions of 
the NLRA (such as the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1978), 
management  apparently  shares the view that union strength  is highly 
sensitive to small changes in the law.25  More recently, changes in the 
bankruptcy  law have eroded the status of union contracts in certain 
circumstances. Since the relative power that management  and labor 
bring  to the bargaining  table can be shaped by the legal as well as the 
economic environment  of industrial  relations, the roles of the NLRA 
and  of recent changes  in the Bankruptcy  Code are worth  exploring. 
UNION  STRENGTH  AND  THE  NATIONAL  LABOR  RELATIONS  ACT 
The elaborate  legal regulation  of labor  relations  in the United States 
centers  on the rights  and  obligations  of unions  and  employers  established 
25. Research  into the impact  of the NLRA is much  less clear  on this point. One study 
found  that  most of the aspects of conduct  during  union  representation  campaigns  that  are 
subject  to regulation  by the NLRB have no bearing  on the outcome  of the elections. See 
Julius  G. Getman,  Stephen  B. Goldberg,  and Jeanne  B. Herman,  Union  Representation 
Elections:  Law and Reality (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation,  1976).  Another  study 
found that consultants  hired by employers  to manage  a company's  resistance  to union 
organizing  attempts  had  little  impact  on the outcome  of representation  elections. See John 
Lawler, "The Impact of Management  Consultants  on the Outcome of Certification 
Elections,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations  Review  (forthcoming,  1984). On the other 
hand, a recent study of the same data resulted  in a more varied  pattern  of conclusions 
concerning the board's impact. See William T. Dickens, "The Effect of Company 
Campaigns  on Certification  Elections: Law and Reality Once Again," Industrial  and 
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in the NLRA. This law establishes  a basic right  to concerted  activity  by 
employees; it seeks to guarantee  that right (1) through  election proce- 
dures  by which unions may become the legal representative  of workers 
in a particular  bargaining  unit and (2) through  the prohibition  of certain 
"unfair  labor practices" by employers and unions that are believed to 
interfere with the objectives of the act. The NLRB, an independent 
regulatory  agency, was established  to oversee the election process and 
to investigate,  prosecute,  and  adjudicate  charges  of unfair  labor  practices 
brought  by unions, employers, and individual  workers.26  The NLRA 
does not cover employees in the public  sector, where  collective bargain- 
ing rights are instead specified in a crazy quilt of legislation  passed by 
state and  local governments  and  in a federal  executive order. 
Over the years, the NLRB has developed a rather  elaborate  system 
of rules  to implement  the act's requirements  that  employers  not discrim- 
inate  against  workers  on the basis of their  union  activities  or sympathies, 
that neither party coerce individuals  in their right to join or to refrain 
from  joining a union, that both parties  bargain  in good faith, and so on. 
As a result, the regulatory  requirements  that have developed out of 
almost  fifty years of NLRB rule making  are an important  consideration 
in union  organizing  campaigns,  collective bargaining  negotiations,  work 
stoppage  activities, and  the representation  of individual  union  members 
by their  organizations. 
The ubiquitous  presence of the NLRB has also fostered  the view that 
notwithstanding  some of the shifts in the composition of employment 
noted above, alterations  in the rights established under the act could 
significantly  alter  the  relative  bargaining  power  of labor  and  management. 
Consideration  of this view leads to the larger  question  of the real  impact 
of the NLRB's regulatory  activity  on behavior  and  bargaining  outcomes, 
a topic on which serious research has begun only recently. Whatever 
the merits  of the larger  debate  over regulatory  impact,  it is clear  from  an 
examination  of the numbers  that union fortunes in representation  and 
decertification  elections (which might be altered by changes in the 
NLRA or in the policy of the NLRB) play a relatively  modest  role in the 
general  decline in union  representation  in the United States. 
In fact, there is no single factor that accounts for the decline in 
26. Organizationally,  the board's Office of the General Counsel, which handles 
investigations  and  prosecutions,  operates  independently  of the board,  which  rules  on the 
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unionization.  To a certain extent, it reflects an apparent  reduction in 
organizing  activity by unions. The percent of nonunion  labor  involved 
in certification  elections declined from about 3 percent in 1950  to less 
than 1  percent  in 1980.  Most of the decline  occurred  rather  precipitously 
in the 1950s,  but  the decline  continued  at a slower  rate  through  the 1970s. 
The effect of declining  organizing  activity during  the period was rein- 
forced by a fairly steady decline since 1950  in the union success rate in 
those elections that did occur. This observation  is consistent with the 
view that increased employer resistance accounts for the decline in 
union  fortunes,  but  it is also consistent  with  a selectivity  process  wherein 
unions  first  attempt  to organize  bargaining  units  in  which  their  probability 
of success is highest (given employee attitudes  toward  union represen- 
tation)  and only later  proceed  to situations  that  offer  a lower probability 
of success. As the cost per organizing  effort rises over time, it is hardly 
surprising  that the resources allocated to organizing  activity declines. 
The fact that the percent of union workers involved in decertification 
elections also increased  steadily  during  the 1970s  has often  been cited as 
a signal  of the increasing  difficulties  faced by unions, but this appears  to 
be a gross overinterpretation  of the small  numbers  involved.27 
BANKRUPTCY  AND  UNION  CONTRACTS 
The legal status of union contracts  in the United States has also been 
altered  in the aftermath  of a revision  of the Bankruptcy  Code completed 
in the Bankruptcy  Reform  Act of 1978.  A purpose  of the revision  was to 
add flexibility to bankruptcy proceedings in order to facilitate the 
reorganization  and rehabilitation  of economically  troubled  businesses. 
Under the previous  law, a firm  that wished to continue  operating  while 
in bankruptcy  proceedings  would have to establish  that  it was insolvent 
in order to initiate proceedings. Subsequently,  trustees would have to 
devise a plan  for  the orderly  reorganization  of a bankrupt  firm  and  present 
27. Decertification  elections involved  about  0.25 percent  of the unionized  labor  force 
by 1980,  leading  the authors  of one interesting  study  to observe  that, "Even at its highest 
and if every election resulted in a decertification,  it would take over 15 years for 
decertifications  to cause a 1-percent  drop  in the percent  of the labor  force organized-all 
other  things  held constant." In fact unions  during  the 1970s  won an average  of about  50 
percent  of decertification  elections. See William  T. Dickens and Jonathan  S. Leonard, 
"Accounting  for the Decline in Union Membership,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations 
Review  (forthcoming,  1984). Robert J. Flanagan  213 
it to a U.S. District  Court  judge  for approval.  The revised  code no longer 
requires a firm to demonstrate current insolvency in order to enter 
bankruptcy  proceedings, and firms  may even claim uncertain  or "con- 
tingent"  liabilities,  such as potential  claims  from  litigation  that may not 
be completed at the time of a bankruptcy  filing. In addition, most 
companies  that  file for protection  from  creditors  under  Chapter  11  of the 
revised code continue to be operated by their pre-petition  managers, 
acting  as "debtors-in-possession.  " While  petitions  for bankruptcy  must 
be reviewed  and  approved  by a bankruptcy  court,  debtors-in-possession 
now  operate  with  less court  supervision  than  occurred  under  the  previous 
law.28 
These developments  created  a clear  conflict  between the Bankruptcy 
Code and  the National  Labor  Relations  Act concerning  the treatment  of 
contracts. On the one hand, the Bankruptcy  Code permits  the  judges of 
bankruptcy  courts  to set aside "executory  contracts"  in order  to achieve 
the successful rehabilitation  and reorganization  of "insolvent" compa- 
nies, but makes no specific mention  of labor  agreements.  On the other, 
the NLRA prohibits  both parties  to a labor  agreement  from  unilaterally 
imposing changes during a contract term, but makes no mention of 
bankruptcy  situations.  Under  the special  status  given labor  contracts  by 
the NLRA, what standards  should  bankruptcy  courts apply  in deciding 
whether labor agreements could be set aside if the petition were ap- 
proved? 
A second issue arose when some major  corporations  appeared  to use 
bankruptcy  proceedings to abandon their labor agreements and the 
procedural  requirements  of U.S. labor  relations  law. In 1983  the Wilson 
Foods Corporation  cited excessive labor costs in its petition  for bank- 
ruptcy  and cut wages by about 40 percent  before the bankruptcy  court 
ruled  on the petition. Continental  Airlines  cut wages by more than  half 
and resumed operations  on a nonunion  basis three days after filing  for 
bankruptcy  and months before a bankruptcy  court would rule on the 
petition. 
In February  1984  the U.S. Supreme  Court  rendered  two rulings  in the 
28. The revision of the bankruptcy  code also shifted much of the supervision  of 
bankruptcy  proceedings  from  federal  district  courts  to specialized  bankruptcy  courts. By 
removing  bankruptcy  proceedings  from the federal courts the new code diluted the 
institutional  inclination  to balance  the public  policy objectives  of bankruptcy  legislation 
with  the conflicting  public  policy objectives  of labor  relations  (and  other)  legislation. 214  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Bildisco  case. In the first  ruling  a unanimous  Court  ruled  that  bankruptcy 
courts  could  release  a company  from  its  union  contracts  without  requiring 
proof that the company would otherwise face imminent  failure (the 
standard  favored  by unions). In the second ruling  the Court  by a 5-to-4 
margin  said that companies  filing  a petition  for bankruptcy  could unilat- 
erally abrogate their labor agreements before the bankruptcy  court 
approved their petition.29  In rejecting the standard  proposed by the 
unions  and the NLRB, the Court  nevertheless  held that the bankruptcy 
courts should  adopt  a "somewhat  stricter"  standard  for rejecting  union 
contracts than the  "business judgment" standard applied to  other 
contracts in bankruptcy  proceedings. It was vague, however, on what 
the standard  should  be.30 
The second part  of the Bildisco decision does obvious violence to the 
procedures that have evolved under the NLRA for modification  of 
collective bargaining  agreements.  Two facts cast doubt on whether  the 
ruling  produces a major  alteration  in the relative bargaining  power of 
labor  and management,  however. First, in permitting  bankruptcy  courts 
to set aside  union  contracts  under  a looser and  more  ambiguous  standard, 
the Supreme  Court  did not alter  the basic representation  rights  of unions 
at firms involved in Chapter 11 proceedings. Indeed, the majority 
decision states that the debtor-in-possession  "is obligated to bargain 
collectively with the employees' certified  representative  over the terms 
of a new contract  pending  rejection  of the existing  contract  or following 
formal  approval  of rejection  by the Bankruptcy  Court."' Second, under 
the NLRA employers have always had the right to hire permanent 
replacements  for strikers  (unless the strike  is in response  to unfair  labor 
practices  by the employer). 
For example, under the Bildisco ruling, a firm may petition for 
bankruptcy  and unilaterally  impose changes that it would otherwise 
have sought in negotiations.32  (This is the tack taken by Continental 
29. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, Supreme  Court  decision  as printed  in Bureau  of 
National  Affairs, Daily Labor Report, no. 36 (February  23, 1984),  pp. D-1-D-12. The 
question  of what  happens  if a bankruptcy  court  fails to approve  the petition  of a company 
that  has set aside  union  contracts  was not addressed. 
30. The Court  also required  bankruptcy  courts  to ascertain  that  there  had  been some 
effort  to achieve a solution  through  voluntary  negotiations  between  the employer  and  the 
union(s)  involved, but did not require  that the bargaining  go to "impasse" as does the 
NLRB. 
31.  NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco,  p. D-7. 
32. Alternatively,  at some later  time, the changes  may be imposed  by a judge of the 
Bankruptcy  Court. Robert J. Flanagan  215 
Airlines  in 1983.)  The union may accept a modification  of the contract. 
But if a union objects to the changes that have been imposed, it can 
initiate  negotiations  demanding  its previous benefits (or some compro- 
mise position). Also as before, the union may strike in support  of its 
demands  in the event of an impasse (as the unions at Continental  did). 
The outcome-including the possibility  that strikers  would be replaced 
(as they were at Continental)-will  be  determined by the relative 
bargaining  power of the parties.  In the absence of the Bildisco ruling  the 
firm could request the same concessions from a union in the normal 
course  of renegotiating  a contract.  The  union  may  agree  to a modification 
of the contract or it may resist the company's request to the point of 
impasse and strike to back up its demands. Eventually, the strike will 
end on terms  that  are determined  by the relative  bargaining  power  of the 
parties.  Under  the  NLRA, this  includes  the  possibility  that  the  employers 
will hire permanent  replacements  for the strikers.  (Under  existing law, 
Continental  could have proposed  and held out for the same drastic  pay 
cuts in collective bargaining  negotiations,  the unions  could have struck, 
and Continental  could have hired permanent  replacements.) The re- 
arrangement  of rights  under  the Bildisco ruling  alters the starting  point 
for negotiations but not the factors that determine the ultimate out- 
come.33 
Conclusions 
The dramatic  collective bargaining  concessions of the early 1980s 
have checked and begun to reverse the growth  of union wages relative 
to nonunion  wages, but at most they are likely to have only a modest 
impact on the long-term  flexibility of aggregate  union wages. This is 
partially  because unions are likely to demand  more  than  the restoration 
of benefits as the firms  that won concessions become more profitable. 
More  important  are the facts that (1) the domain  of concession bargain- 
ing, while large  in comparison  to the past, is limited  in comparison  with 
the general  scope of collective bargaining,  and (2) negotiations  have in 
large  measure  had little impact  on the structural  features of collective 
33. As this was being written, Congress was deadlocked  over general bankruptcy 
legislation.  A bill  in the House of Representatives  includes  a provision  that  would  mitigate 
the Bildisco decision. Under this legislation, labor contracts could be set aside by a 
bankruptcy  court only if retaining  the contract  would result  in a loss of employment.  A 
Senate  bill  stays closer to the  Bildisco  decision. 216  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
bargaining  agreements  that most influence  wage flexibility  and the past 
growth  of union  relative  wages. In particular,  most contracts,  including 
those with substantial  first-year  concessions, continue to include fixed 
deferred  pay increases. In addition,  neither  the duration  of contracts  nor 
the prevalence  of COLAs has changed  in any lasting  respect, and most 
of the reduced  influence  of COLAs on union wage changes in the early 
1980s  can be traced  to the deceleration  of prices. 
Whether  the union-nonunion  wage differential  will continue  to drop 
below its recent historical high depends on the relationship  between 
fixed, "annual-improvement-factor"  increases  and  productivity  growth. 
In some of the industries,  future  productivity  growth  will depend  in part 
on the ultimate  impact  of changes in work rules negotiated  in the early 
1980s.  Barring  major  changes  in productivity  trends,  a sustained  decline 
in the union relative wage will depend on the willingness of unions to 
share more of the risk of uncertain  future productivity  movements by 
trading  profit  sharing  (or other compensation  measures  indexed to the 
firm's  performance)  for some portion  of the traditional  annual  improve- 
ment factor. That is, while retaining  traditional  contract  forms, unions 
might  negotiate  smaller  fixed  increases  than  in the past  but  add  or  expand 
upon profit-sharing  (or related) provisions to handle uncertainty  over 
future productivity, much the way COLAs now address uncertainty 
over future  prices. 
A major  novelty of recent concession negotiations  has indeed been 
an increased interest in indexing at least part of the compensation 
package  to firm  performance.  To date  the interest  is limited  to industries 
in economic distress, and whether the median union worker in these 
industries  is willing  to accept a riskier  compensation  scheme  in exchange 
for greater  job security in the long run is itself uncertain.  Some of the 
plans include distributional  formulas that may divide high- and low- 
skilled workers on the desirability  of retaining  the plans. Moreover, 
adoption  of such  arrangements  by industries  that  do not share  the distress 
seems unlikely. With  job security well protected  by seniority arrange- 
ments, the median  union voter has little incentive to accept a compen- 
sation scheme that offers a less certain  income scheme. Finally, struc- 
tural features of some of the profit-sharing  plans appear to mute the 
potential wage flexibility that could result from such compensation 
arrangements. Comments 
and Discussion 
Marvin  H. Kosters: It is clear  that  widespread  union  wage concessions 
and contract renegotiations  during the past few years were unusual 
developments in collective bargaining,  and that these developments 
produced  unusually  small average  union wage increases last year. It is 
much less clear, however, what these recent developments mean for 
future wage flexibility  in the union sectors and at the macroeconomic 
level. 
It is possible to make  the case that  little in the way of increased  wage 
flexibility  over the business cycle should be expected on the basis of 
developments  we have seen so far. Bob Flanagan  makes  this case in his 
careful review of recent union wage trends, changes in provisions of 
contracts,  and  changes  in  the  legal  environment  for  collective  bargaining. 
Although  he makes  the case well, his paper  has not led me to modify  my 
own somewhat different  conclusion that I expressed in a recent paper 
on essentially the same subject. I want to explore why we have placed 
somewhat  different  interpretations  on what  recent  developments  suggest 
about  long-term  union  wage flexibility. 
There are several points on which we seem to agree. We have both, 
of course, looked at basically the same data. We agree that the union 
concessions were not exclusively attributable  to cyclical forces. I also 
agree with Flanagan  that the concessions took place in the context of 
little strike activity; that changes in labor law administration  were 
probably  not a significant  factor; that contract duration  has remained 
roughly  unchanged;  that new provisions  in labor  contracts  will not, by 
themselves, introduce  much more flexibility  than previously;  and that 
new  provisions  may  not spread  or even be retained  over the longer  term. 
Where  we differ  is on what  we mean  by  long-term  union  wage  flexibility 
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and where to look for clues. Flanagan's  focus in this paper  is primarily 
on union  wage flexibility  over the business cycle in response  to cyclical 
changes  in demand.  His  judgment  that  no marked  changes  in union  wage 
flexibility  should be expected is based primarily  on his examination  of 
the extent to which  changes  in contract  provisions  have been introduced 
that would more or less automatically  provide  more wage flexibility  in 
response to demand  changes. His view about  where to look for clues is 
quite explicitly stated: "It is contractual  alterations  in the means by 
which union wages adjust  to contingencies  that hold the most promise 
for  greater  macroeconomic  wage  flexibility  and  a reduction  in the union- 
nonunion  wage gap." I should  note, however, that  he also discusses the 
legal environment  which, with the possible exception of bankruptcy- 
related issues, could be expected to influence  wage behavior without 
regard  to cyclical conditions. 
In my work, I have not been primarily  concerned with union wage 
flexibility over the business cycle. Instead, my interest has been in 
whether  recent  developments  suggest  increased  responsiveness  of union 
wages to underlying  economic conditions, particularly  in industries  in 
which wage levels appear  to be seriously  out of line with what might  be 
expected in competitive markets. As  a consequence, I  have been 
interested in flexibility  in terms of adjustments  in relative wages over 
periods longer  than the business cycle. My emphasis  has been on what 
has happened to competition in product markets and how collective 
bargaining  as an institution  has coped with  the introduction  of increased 
competition.  To make  ajudgment  about  what  recent  experience  suggests 
about  union  wage flexibility,  I have looked at a range  of union  responses 
broader  than  changes  in contract  provisions. 
I disagree somewhat  with Flanagan's  view that recent experience is 
"in large  measure  more  an extension than  a break  with past union  wage 
behavior.  " As evidence of a break  with  the past, I would  point  to several 
instances of renegotiation  of contracts before they were scheduled to 
expire,  agreement  to give up  or  defer  scheduled  wage  or  benefit  increases, 
readjustment  of long-term  contract  formulas  (at least temporarily),  and 
an increased  frequency  of departure  from  common, industry-wide  con- 
tract  arrangements.  Perhaps  the most notable,  and  perhaps  unexpected, 
break with past practices is the emergence of agreements providing 
differentially  lower wages for newly hired  workers.  Increased  attention 
is apparently  being given to modification  of work rules to reduce labor 
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management  efforts to seek mutually  agreeable  arrangements  in areas 
where interests may diverge less sharply than on rates of pay. How 
significant  or durable  these departures  are is uncertain,  of course, but I 
have been impressed with the inventive ways in which bargaining 
practices  have adapted  to changes  in the competitive  environment. 
I see the timing and size of union wage concessions as influenced 
importantly  by the recent long recession. But their  occurrence  is a fact 
I  attribute mainly to  the pressures of  competition on  union wage 
premiums,  premiums  that  had  been expanding  during  the 1970s.  In other 
words, I see what happened  in several major  union labor markets as 
derivative  of what happened  to competition  in product  markets,  mainly 
deregulation  in transportation  industries  and stronger  competition  from 
international  sources. 
I see prospects  for union  wage flexibility  in the future  as contingent, 
therefore, on what happens to competition in product markets and 
service markets.  It seems to me that some of the adjustments  that have 
occurred  are  only initial  steps toward  more  realistic  wage levels and  that 
some  of these adjustments  are  nowhere  near  completion.  In  the  telephone 
communications  area, for example, growing  pressures for adjustment 
seem likely. In sectors affected by international  trade, further  adjust- 
ments will depend on our trade policies. Although the kind of union 
wage  flexibility  that  I have  in  mind  here  is not, strictly  speaking,  increased 
flexibility  over the business cycle, I would  expect some cyclical pattern 
because pressures for adjustment  will be more pronounced during 
recession. 
I should concede, perhaps,  that I am not satisfied  that I can explain 
the rise in union wage premiums  in several sectors during  the 1970s; 
inertia  in wage-setting  formulas  and practices may have been a factor. 
Also, I would not pretend  to be able to specify precisely the size and 
pattern  of normal,  equilibrium  union wage premiums;  I am persuaded, 
however,  that  whatever  such  levels are,  they  were significantly  exceeded 
in  the recent  past  in several  industries.  Evidence  pointing  in  this  direction 
includes shrinking  union shares in partially  unionized industries and 
declining  competitiveness  in some very highly  unionized  activities. The 
introduction  of differentially  lower  pay  for  newly  hired  workers  in several 
instances, with employers apparently  having  no difficulty  in attracting 
new workers  at these lower pay levels, is also consistent  with this view. 
I am inclined  to agree  with Flanagan's  view that there is little reason 
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of new provisions in collective bargaining  agreements  that link pay to 
changes  in performance  of firms.  My presumption  is that maintaining  a 
degree of stability  in wage trends over the business cycle in cyclically 
sensitive industries  will continue to be an important  union goal, as it 
seems to have been in the past. Consequently,  I am inclined  to view the 
limited  changes that we have seen in this direction  as an effort to offset 
or disguise  wage concessions to make  them more  palatable  to the union 
membership.  It is my impression,  for  example,  that  the essential  purpose 
of union  ownership  arrangements,  in particular,  has been to bring  about 
significant  adjustment  to lower wages. This may be less true for profit- 
sharing  or stock-accumulation  plans historically, but in many recent 
concession situations  it seems more appropriate  to view these plans as 
offsets to or rebates  on the concessions than as initiatives  in pursuit  of 
union  bargaining  goals. 
In summary,  like Flanagan  I see little in recent union labor market 
developments  that  will introduce  increased  wage flexibility  in a system- 
atic or mechanical  way over the business cycle. But I do see increased 
union  wage flexibility  resulting  from  more  competition,  and  I expect the 
timing  of adjustments  in union wage trends-both  up and down-to  be 
affected by the cycle. It is important  not to exaggerate  the macroeco- 
nomic implications  of this increased  union  wage flexibility,  however, in 
view of the  relatively  small  and  generally  declining  share  of the  workforce 
represented  by major  unions. 
General  Discussion 
James Duesenberry observed that models of wage behavior that 
stressed product market  conditions were advanced  forty years ago by 
John Dunlop and that instances of wage concessions when industries 
were in exceptional financial trouble could be found throughout  the 
postwar period. He interpreted  the low end of the Phillips curve as 
reflecting  not the unemployment  situation  but the correlation  between 
unemployment  and  the number  of industries  that  were  in serious  financial 
trouble.  In recent years such situations  went from  being  isolated  excep- 
tions to being so widespread  as to become a notable  feature  in overall 
union  wage developments. The length and depth of the recession was 
one reason. But the rise in foreign  competition  in some sectors and the 
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been equally important  in creating this situation. Because these new 
sources of competition will still be present as an economic recovery 
proceeds, Duesenberry  reasoned  that the pressure  on union  wages will 
continue.  If, as a result,  the relative  wages of unions  have stopped  rising, 
the prospects for inflation  could be better than a simple cyclical model 
would suggest. Wynn Bussmann added that in most durable goods 
industries,  the recession was barely interrupted  by the brief economic 
rebound  in late 1980  and early 1981.  Union employment  was depressed 
for three or even four years in many durable  goods industries,  and the 
recovery that is finally occurring  is still relatively weak among union 
workers, even in areas, such as autos, where subcontractors  are often 
nonunion.  He concluded  that  the union  wage differential  was unlikely  to 
widen again, as it had during  the 1970s, and the inflationary  pressure 
from  that source will be absent. 
Robert Hall emphasized that two-tier wage systems, which were 
showing  up in some especially hard-pressed  industries  such as airlines, 
achieved desirable  allocational  effects by permitting  the firm  to employ 
the efficient  level of labor  while still preserving  the earnings  premium  of 
existing union employees. This arrangement  eases the tension between 
higher  wages and  fewerjobs that  normally  confronts  a union  in deciding 
on its wage demands.  Given that two-tier  arrangements  have come into 
existence and  have this desirable  property,  Hall  was puzzled  that  unions 
are losing decertification  elections even though  a two-tier  arrangement 
would be unambiguously  good for existing union members. Marvin 
Kosters observed that  such arrangements  would  have only small  effects 
in an industry,  such as automobiles,  where  the trend  of employment  was 
downward  so that  there  would  be few new workers  hired  to make  up the 
second tier. By contrast, in an industry  with a lot of turnover  or one in 
which  employment  is expanding  substantially,  lower  wages for a second 
tier of new workers  might  be a sustainable  situation  for a time, until  the 
number  of new workers  became  large  enough  to acquire  political  power. 
Once  a significant  proportion  of workers  were in the bottom  tier, Kosters 
reasoned, management  could offer them a wage increase in exchange 
for getting rid of the premium  enjoyed by the senior workers. Thus he 
found it hard to see the two-tier system lasting for very long. Robert 
Flanagan  added that two-tier contracts are not new; but because they 
ultimately  threaten  the senior  workers  as they lose political  power  within 
the  union,  they  have  a desire  to eliminate  them  when  economic  conditions 
in the industry  permit. 